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CHEVRON HAS ONLY ONE STEP* 
Matthew C. Stephenson† and Adrian Vermeule‡ 
 
[The agency’s] view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute . . . . [S]urely if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then 
any  agency  interpretation  contradicting  what  Congress  has  said 
would be unreasonable. 




HEVRON U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council lays out a 
two-step process that courts must follow when they review a federal 
agency‘s construction of a federal statute.
2 Despite the prominence of 
this two-step framework, we will argue that Chevron, properly unders-
tood, has only one step.
3 Chevron‘s artificial division of one inquiry into 
 
* We are grateful to Ken Bamberger, David Barron, Lisa Bressman, Jake Gersen, Orin 
Kerr, Anne Joseph O‘Connell, Todd Rakoff, Cass Sunstein, Alexander Volokh, and Judge 
Stephen Williams for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
† Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. 
‡ John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
 
1 No. 07–588, slip op. at 7 & n.4 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2009). 
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
3 We are not the first to point out the difficulties of distinguishing between  Chevron‘s two 
steps as well as between Chevron and other strands of judicial review doctrine. See, e.g., 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 
1994), rev‘d, 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpre-
tation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron‘s Step Two, 2 Admin. L.J. 255, 256 n.10 (1988); 
Colloquy, Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and 
Deference to the Agency, 4 Admin. L.J. 113, 123–24, 126 (1990) (remarks of Hon. Stephen 
F. Williams) [hereinafter Williams]; Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agen-
cy Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 313, 338 (1996); Ronald 
M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253, 
1260–61 (1997). Indeed, leading casebooks point out the difficulties of drawing these dis-
tinctions. See Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 327–29 
(6th ed. 2006); Ronald A. Cass et al., Administrative Law 143–44 (5th ed. 2006); Peter L. 
Strauss  et  al.,  Gellhorn  and  Byse‘s Administrative  Law  1034, 1036–40  (10th  ed. 2003). 
These teaching materials, however, typically equivocate on whether these doctrinal distinc-
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two creates a conceptual problem, not merely a semantic one. The two-
step  structure  causes  material  confusion  among  commentators  and 
courts, with harmful consequences for administrative law doctrine and 
scholarship. Rather than trying to breathe life into each of  Chevron‘s 
two steps, judges, scholars, and teachers of administrative law should 
jettison the two-step framework and acknowledge that Chevron calls for 
a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency‘s statutory inter-
pretation.
4 
I. CHEVRON‘S LOGIC, RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD 
Under current doctrine, a court that reviews an agency‘s interpretation 
of a statute must address two questions (relevant here). The first ques-
tion is whether the agency‘s construction of the statute is permissible on 
the merits, in light of the appropriate tools and principles of statutory in-
terpretation. The second question is whether the agency‘s interpretive 
choice was the product of reasoned decisionmaking: even if the agency‘s 
interpretation is plausible as a construction of the statutory language, the 
agency‘s choice among plausible interpretations must not be ―arbitrary 
[or] capricious.‖
5 
Chevron divides the first inquiry—whether the agency‘s interpreta-
tion of the statute is valid—into two steps. At Step One, the court must 
ask  whether,  after  ―employing  traditional  tools  of  statutory  construc-
tion,‖
6 it is evident that ―Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
 
tions are ultimately sustainable, often suggesting that they are. We want to argue unambi-
guously that they are not. 
4 A semantic difficulty with our assertion that  Chevron has only one step involves the 
question whether Chevron applies in the first place. Commentators sometimes say that Che-
vron has no fewer than three steps: the two steps recited in Chevron itself and an antecedent 
step at which courts decide whether Chevron or instead the older Skidmore analysis supplies 
the legal standard of deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.  218, 226–27 
(2001). This antecedent step is sometimes referred to as ―Chevron Step Zero.‖ See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187 (2006). If one accepts that terminology, 
then our claim is that Chevron has two steps rather than three: Step Zero, plus the single step 
created by collapsing what courts currently describe as Steps One and Two. Alternatively, 
some prefer to describe the antecedent issue of whether Chevron applies at all as the ques-
tion of ―Chevron‘s Domain.‖ See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,  Chevron‘s 
Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2001). In that formulation, our thesis is that once a case falls 
within Chevron‘s domain, the Chevron analysis has only one step, rather than two. For sim-
plicity, we use the latter formulation. 
5 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
6 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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question at issue‖;
7 if so, the statute is ―unambiguous[].‖
8 If, however, 
the court decides at Step One that the statute is ambiguous, the court 
proceeds to Step Two. At Step Two, the court must uphold the agency‘s 
interpretation so long as it is ―based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.‖
9 Subsequent courts and commentators have treated Step Two as 
a requirement that the agency‘s statutory interpretation be ―reasonable.‖
 
If it is not, the court must reject it. 
This structure artificially divides one inquiry into two steps. The sin-
gle question is whether the agency‘s construction is permissible as a 
matter of statutory interpretation; the two Chevron steps both ask this 
question, just in different ways. As a result, the two steps are mutually 
convertible. 
If an agency‘s construction of the statute is ―contrary to clear con-
gressional intent . . . on the precise question at issue,‖
10 then the agen-
cy‘s construction is a fortiori not ―based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.‖
11 Step One is therefore nothing more than a special case of 
Step Two, which implies that all Step One opinions could be written in 
the language of Step Two.
12 Consider, as an example, FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson  Tobacco,  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  struck  down  the 
FDA‘s assertion of statutory jurisdiction over tobacco products.
13 The 
Court reached this conclusion under Step One, asserting that Congress 
had expressed  an  intention  on  the  ―precise  question‖  of  whether  the 
FDA could regulate tobacco.
14 It would have been equally easy, howev-
er, for the Court to find under Step One that the full scope of the FDA‘s 
statutory jurisdiction is ambiguous—as it obviously is, given the numer-
ous cases in which the courts of appeal have found ambiguity in the 
 
7 Id. at 842. 
8 Id. at 843. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 843 n.9. 
11 Id. at 843. 
12 See 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 170–71 (4th ed. 2002); see also 
Levin, supra note 3, at 1282–83 (noting how judicial opinions that invalidate an agency‘s 
interpretation under Step Two could easily have been written as Step One opinions); Byse, 
supra note 3, at 256 n.10 (―[O]ne could, with considerable logic, conflate the two steps of 
Chevron into one . . . because if the intent of Congress is clear, a nonconforming interpreta-
tion would necessarily be unreasonable.‖). 
13 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
14 Id. at 132–33. STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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same (or closely related) statutory language
15—but to declare that the 
FDA‘s assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products was unreasonable 
under Chevron Step Two, for precisely the same reasons the Court ad-
vanced in the actual opinion. 
Conversely, suppose the Court says that the statute is ambiguous at 
Step One but that the agency‘s interpretation is invalid at Step Two be-
cause it is not a permissible resolution of the ambiguity. This is analyti-
cally equivalent to saying that Congress did have an intention on the 
―precise question at issue‖—if that question is framed not as ―What does 
this statute mean?‖ but rather ―Is the agency‘s interpretation within the 
permissible range of readings?‖ Congress‘ precise intention was to ex-
clude the agency‘s interpretation from the permissible range. On this ac-
count, all Step Two opinions could be rewritten in the language of Step 
One. Consider, for example, Goldstein v. SEC,
 in which the D.C. Circuit 
struck down an SEC rule that regulated hedge funds under the Invest-
ment Advisors Act.
16 The court apparently treated this as a Chevron Step 
Two case: the opinion acknowledged that the relevant statutory language 
was ambiguous but concluded that the SEC‘s rule was not consistent 
with any permissible reading of the statute.
17 The court, however, could 
just as equally have resolved the case at Step One, framing the ―precise 
question‖ as whether the Investment Advisors Act covers hedge funds 
and concluding that the answer was a clear ―no.‖ 
Because Step One and Step Two opinions are always mutually con-
vertible, Chevron has a unitary logic that requires only one step.
18 The 






15 See, e.g. Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 949–52 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ala. Tissue 
Ctr. of Univ. of Ala. Health Serv. Found. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir. 1992); 
E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 682–84 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
16 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
17 Id. at 880–81. 
18 See Williams, supra note 3, at 123–24, 126; see also Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review 
in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 Tulsa 
L.J. 221, 243 (1996) (suggesting that whether a case is decided at Step One or Step Two de-
pends on ―how judges identify the precise question at issue, since at one  
level of generality the statute may answer it under Chevron step one, but at a more refined 
level there may be an ambiguity‖). STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 












  The diagram depicts the set of possible interpretations of a given sta-
tute as a one-dimensional space. The statutory language, read in light of 
the traditional tools of statutory construction, will suggest to the review-
ing court both a ―best‖ interpretation of the statute (interpretation ―A‖ in 
the diagram) and a range of interpretations that are sufficiently plausible 
that the court would view them as reasonable, though not ideal. This 
range  is  the  statute‘s  ―zone  of  ambiguity,‖  the  set  of  interpretations 
which the statute does not clearly prohibit.
19 If the agency promulgates 
an interpretation within this zone (such as interpretation ―B‖ in the dia-
gram), then under Chevron the reviewing court must uphold the agen-
cy‘s  interpretation,  even  though  it  differs  from  the  court‘s  most-
preferred construction (interpretation ―A‖). But if the agency chooses an 
interpretation outside the range of permissible meanings (such as inter-
pretation ―C‖ in the diagram), the court must strike it down. 
In the latter case, where the court invalidates the agency‘s position at 
C, one could say that the court decided the case at Step One, because the 
statute unambiguously prohibits the agency‘s interpretation. One could 
also say that the court decided the case at Step Two. On this rendition, 
the court pointed out, first, that the statute is ―ambiguous‖ in the sense 
that the range of permissible interpretations contains more than a single 
element, but, second, that the agency‘s interpretation lies outside this 
 
19 The size of the zone need not be fixed by the statute itself; the amount of interpretive 
latitude the court gives the agency—the amount the court would permit the agency to deviate 
from the court‘s ideal reading—may depend in part on other factors, such as the court‘s con-
fidence in the agency‘s expertise, its sympathy for the agency‘s policy goals, or its assess-
ment of the importance of the interpretive issue. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic 
Substitution  Effect:  Textual  Plausibility,  Procedural  Formality,  and  Judicial  Review  of 
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 528, 547–48 (2006). 
Range of Permissible Interpretations 
(“Zone of Ambiguity”) 
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range. Distinguishing between these approaches serves no useful pur-
pose, since the nature of the analysis is identical in either case. 
We might distinguish Step One and Step Two by interpreting Step 
One to ask whether Congress has clearly specified one, and only one, 
permissible interpretation of the statute. This approach assumes that a 
statute can unambiguously forbid an agency‘s interpretation only when 
Congress has specified a single possible meaning. But that assumption is 
false: Congress‘ intention may be ambiguous within a range, but not at 
all ambiguous as to interpretations outside that range, which are clearly 
forbidden. As E. Donald Elliott argues, Chevron‘s deep logic eliminates 
the classical idea that judges always can and should find a ―point esti-
mate‖ of statutory meaning.
20 Rather, Chevron supposes that interpreta-
tion is an exercise in identifying the statute‘s range of reasonable inter-
pretations, a range that opens up a ―policy space‖ within which agencies 
may make reasoned choices
21—the ―zone of ambiguity‖ depicted in our 
diagram. 
There is therefore no good reason why we should decide whether the 
statute has only one possible reading before deciding simply whether the 
agency‘s interpretation falls into the range of permissible interpretations. 
After all, the case in which the statute has only one permissible interpre-
tation is just a special case of the analysis described above. In our dia-
gram, if Congress has been so clear that only one interpretation is possi-
ble,  then  the  ―zone  of  ambiguity‖  would  consist  of  a  single  point 
(interpretation ―A‖), so of course any other interpretation (such as ―B‖ 
or ―C‖) would fall outside the permissible zone. But nothing of conse-
quence turns on whether the set of permissible interpretations has one 
element  or  more  than  one  element; the  only  question  is  whether  the 
agency‘s interpretation is in that set or not. 
II. CHEVRON AND RATIONALITY REVIEW 
Some courts and commentators try to save  Chevron‘s two-step in-
quiry by interpreting the content of the two steps differently. On this 
view,  the  question  whether  the  agency‘s  interpretation  is  permissible 
takes place entirely at Step One, while Step Two concerns the question 
whether the agency made its choice among permissible interpretations in 
 
20 See E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles 
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 1, 11 (2005). 
21 Id. at 12. STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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a reasonable manner. Indeed, this seems to be the preferred position of 
most of those who have considered seriously the apparent redundancy of 
Steps One and Two.
22 
The problem with this approach is that it renders  Chevron Step Two 
redundant with standard State Farm-style
23 hard look review under the 
―arbitrary  and  capricious‖  standard.
24  After  all,  an  agency‘s  choice 
among permissible interpretations of a statutory provision is an exercise 
of  policy  discretion;  Chevron  itself  is  explicit  about  that  point.
25  As 
such, an agency‘s interpretive decision is subject to the ordinary stric-
tures that attach to an agency‘s discretionary choice among policy alter-
natives: the decision must be based on a consideration of the relevant 
factors, and the agency must offer an explanation that is plausible and 
consistent with the evidence before it.
26 A second Chevron step equiva-
lent to the State Farm inquiry is therefore superfluous. 
The two-step  Chevron  framework  inevitably  creates  a redundancy; 
the only question is which redundancy it creates. On the one hand, if 
Step Two is about the plausibility of the agency‘s construction of the 
statute, then Step One and Step Two are redundant. On the other hand, if 
Step Two asks whether the agency‘s interpretation is the product of a 
 
22 See Nat‘l Ass‘n of Regulatory Util. Comm‘rs v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 
1994); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872 F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Pierce, supra 
note 12, at 172–74; Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Com-
ment on Levin and Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377, 1377–79 (1997); Levin, supra note 3, 
at  1276;  Laurence  H.  Silberman,  Chevron—The  Intersection of  Law  &  Policy,  58  Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 821, 827–28 (1990). For a useful summary of D.C. Circuit opinions that have 
treated Chevron Step Two and hard look review as overlapping, see Levin, supra note 3, at 
1263–66. Others, however, have criticized the attempt to collapse Step Two and hard look 
review. See e.g., Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., concur-
ring); Continental Air Lines v. Dep‘t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
Wald, supra note 18, at 244. 
23 Motor Vehicle Mfrs.  Ass‘n v.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44 
(1983). 
24 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (no ting 
this redundancy); Pierce, supra note 12, at 172–74 (same). 
25 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45, 864–66 ; see also Health Ins. Ass‘n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 
F.3d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (―[R]eview of an agency‘s construction of an ambiguous sta-
tute is review of the agency‘s policy judgments.‖). 
26 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–44; see also Lawson, supra note 3, at 326 (―[A]n agency can 
satisfy the Chevron test and still lose the case . . . if the agency reaches its interpretation 
through a decisionmaking process that is ‗arbitrary‘ or ‗capricious‘ . . . .‖); cf. Nat‘l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (stating that al-
though interpretive inconsistency is irrelevant to the Chevron inquiry, if this inconsistency is 
not adequately explained it might render the agency‘s interpretation arbitrary and capricious 
under State Farm). STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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reasoned decisionmaking process, then Step Two is redundant with State 
Farm. We have the doctrinal equivalent of musical chairs, with three 
doctrines (Chevron Step One, Chevron Step Two, State Farm) and only 
two chairs (interpretive reasonableness and reasoned decisionmaking). 
The  question,  therefore, is  which  doctrinal  distinction  should  be  col-
lapsed and which preserved? 
Contrary to the views of most of the other scholars who have consi-
dered this issue,
27 we believe that conflating Chevron Step Two‘s ―rea-
sonableness‖ analysis with State Farm‘s reasoned decisionmaking anal-
ysis is more confusing than our suggestion, which is simply to collapse 
Chevron‘s two current steps into one. Our proposed revision would cla-
rify the doctrine while keeping the interpretive question and the ―rea-
soned  decisionmaking‖  question  analytically  separate.  Trying  to  save 
Chevron‘s two steps by reading one of them as equivalent to arbitrary 
and capricious review serves no useful purpose and creates additional 




27 See Lawson, supra note 22. Gary Lawson initially took the position that Chevron‘s two 
steps should simply be collapsed into one inquiry, but he was subsequently persuaded by 
Ronald Levin‘s analysis that Chevron Step Two should be read as coterminous with State 
Farm-style hard look review. Compare Lawson, supra note 3, at 340 (1996) (―[S]ubstantive 
reasonableness under Chevron step two should be judged solely by reference to the organic 
statute under consideration, while substantive reasonableness under the arbitrary or capri-
cious test can be judged by anything that is generally relevant to reasoned decisionmak-
ing.‖), with Lawson, supra note 22, at 1377–80 (1997) (noting that in contrast to Professor 
Lawson‘s own earlier argument, ―Professor Levin would convert step one into an all-things-
considered assessment of the substantive reasonableness of the agency‘s interpretation and 
make step two a straightforward application of arbitrary or capricious review,‖ concluding 
that this analysis is ―almost certainly right,‖ and declaring, ―Sign me up‖). We think Profes-
sor Lawson had it right the first time around. 
28 Professor Levin—one of the principal advocates of reconceptualizing Step Two as noth-
ing more than standard arbitrary and capricious review—has indicated that he takes this po-
sition in part because it ―is too late in the day to simply abrogate the second step as excess 
baggage; the prestige of the Chevron formula makes such a development unlikely.‖ Levin, 
supra note 3, at 1296. It seems (though this is not entirely clear) that Professor Levin may 
share  our  view  that  simply  eliminating  the  distinction  between  Step  One  and  Step  Two 
would be the best and clearest solution to the doctrinal overlap. We tend to agree with Pro-
fessor Levin that if this turns out to be impossible, explicitly collapsing Step Two and State 
Farm is better than continuing to suggest some special, independent role for each of Che-
vron‘s two steps. We differ from Professor Levin only insofar as we do not believe Che-
vron‘s two-step structure is so sacrosanct that it must now be accommodated. In our view, it 
takes no more intellectual work, and no more disruption of existing doctrine, to collapse 
Steps One and Two than it does to collapse Step Two and State Farm. STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONFUSION 
Perhaps the consequences of Chevron‘s misleading two-step structure 
are not severe. After all, despite the regular, almost ritualistic, invocation 
of the Chevron two-step, most courts seem to have a clear understanding 
of the two relevant questions—Is the agency‘s construction permissible? 
Was it the product of a reasoned decisionmaking process?—and they 
manage to address these questions without tripping over the superfluity 
of one or the other of Chevron‘s two steps. A model opinion, in this re-
spect anyway, is the Supreme Court‘s recent Global Crossing decision, 
in which the Court upheld an agency regulation by simply concluding 
that  the  agency‘s  interpretation  was  ―reasonable  [and] 
hence . . . lawful,‖
29 without reciting the Chevron two-step test in the ta-
lismanic fashion of so many lower courts. A substantial number of court 
of appeals decisions also collapse the Chevron analysis into a single in-
quiry,  without  much  obvious  effect  on  the  bottom-line  question  of 
whether the agency‘s interpretation is upheld.
30 Nonetheless, we believe 
that the confusion engendered by Chevron‘s artificial division of one in-
quiry into two steps has adverse consequences for administrative law 
doctrine and scholarship. 
First, insofar as judges believe that Step One requires them to ascer-
tain  whether  the  statute  has  a  single,  clear  meaning  before  deciding 
whether the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable, the two-step structure 
may actually undermine some of the values that Chevron deference is 
supposed  to  advance.  For  one  thing,  if  judges  spend  an  inordinate 
amount of time trying to figure out the best construction of the statute, it 
may be difficult for them to shift mental gears to decide whether an 
agency interpretation that differs from the judge‘s sense of the best in-
terpretation is nonetheless reasonable.
31 For another, the more judges are 
 
29 Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones Telecomms., 550 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2007). 
30 See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doc-
trine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 30 (1998) (finding, in a sample of 
over 200 court of appeals cases decided in 1995–1996, that the courts applying Chevron 
―condensed the two-step test into a single question of whether the interpretation was ‗rea-
sonable‘ in 28% of the applications‖); id. at 31 (finding that courts that collapsed Chevron 
into one step upheld the agency interpretation 78% of the time, while those courts that pre-
served the two-step framework upheld the agency interpretation 71% of the time). 
31 It is not clear whether this is in fact a problem, and if it is, how large a problem it may 
be. For discussion, compare Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 
116 Yale L.J. 676, 693–98 (2007) (suggesting that this psychological claim is plausible), 
with Matthew C. Stephenson, The Costs of Voting Rule Chevron: A Comment on Gersen STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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inclined to declare that a statute has one and only one meaning, the 
harder it will be for future agencies to adopt alternative constructions of 
the same statute that the initial court did not anticipate.
32 
Second, if judges interpret St ep Two as imposing a ―reasoned deci-
sionmaking‖ requirement that strongly resembles State Farm, as many 
commentators have advocated, the result may be an unjustified departure 
from the standard approach to hard look review in the statutory interpre-
tation context. Courts may mistakenly conclude that they must always 
resolve the question of interpretive plausibility before addressing the is-
sue of reasoned decisionmaking, because the former is part of Step One 
and the latter is part of Step Two. Yet there are cases in which the agen-
cy has clearly failed the reasoned decisionmaking requirement, while the 
interpretive question is close. It is pointless to require courts to proceed 
to the reasoned decisionmaking question only after answering the inter-
pretive question, and because neither question goes to the court‘s juris-
diction, there is no legal obligation to do so. More generally, separating 
the  ―reasoned  decisionmaking‖  requirement  into  two  separate  inqui-
ries—Chevron  Step  Two  and  State  Farm  hard  look  review—invites 
courts to assume that arbitrary and capricious review is more rigorous, 
or less rigorous, or just somehow different in the context of statutory in-
terpretation than in other domains where agencies make discretionary 
policy choices.
33 But there is no obvious reason why this should be so. 
 
and  Vermeule‘s  Proposal,  116  Yale  L.J.  Pocket  Part  238,  239–42  (2007),  available  at 
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/99.pdf (expressing doubts). 
32 See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–85 
(2005). The decision whether or not to collapse Chevron‘s two steps has no effect whatsoev-
er on the question whether a prior judicial construction of a statute in a non-Chevron case 
will preclude an agency from later adopting a different interpretation (the issue with which 
the Brand X case was principally concerned). Under Brand X, a prior judicial construction 
binds the agency only if the earlier court‘s holding clearly indicated that the alternative in-
terpretation now favored by the agency was unambiguously forbidden. Id. Under our frame-
work, Brand X operates exactly the same way: if the prior court stated clearly that the agen-
cy‘s (current) interpretation was outside the zone of the permissible, then the agency may not 
now adopt that interpretation. Here too, nothing in the logical structure of the inquiry re-
quires a distinction between cases in which the zone of the permissible reduces to a single 
point, and cases in which it does not—the distinction at the heart of the current two-step 
framework. 
33 See Cont‘l Air Lines v. Dep‘t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (insist-
ing that Chevron Step Two involves a fundamentally different sort of ―reasonableness‖ in-
quiry than standard hard look review, such that the latter body of doctrine cannot be applied 
wholesale in the statutory interpretation context); Lawson, supra note 3, at 341 (―[T]he stan-
dard of review for agency outcomes under the arbitrary or capricious test may be more defe-
rential than the standard of review under Chevron step two.‖); Wald, supra note 18, at 244 STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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Third, the artificial division between Chevron‘s two ―steps‖ muddies 
the relationship between Chevron deference and other tools of statutory 
interpretation, such as canons of construction, legislative history, and 
purposive analysis. The relationship between Chevron and these other 
interpretive  tools  raises  a  host  of  difficult  and  important  issues,  yet 
judges and scholars are sometimes distracted by the question whether 
this or that interpretive tool ought to come into play at Step One or Step 
Two, instead of focusing on the real questions. Consider, for example, 
the Ninth Circuit‘s recent en banc decision in Morales-Izquierdo v. Gon-
zales, in which Judge Kozinski‘s majority opinion and Judge Thomas‘s 
dissent debated the appropriate relationship between Chevron deference 
and  the  constitutional  avoidance  canon.
34  Both opinions unhelpfully 
 
(arguing that failing to recognize the distinction between Chevron and hard look review will 
lead courts to be too aggressive in reviewing agency interpretations); Williams, supra note 3, 
at 123–24, 126 (hypothesizing that Chevron‘s two-step structure creates the misleading im-
pression that rationality review in the statutory interpretation context is less demanding than 
in other contexts). It is important here to distinguish those considerations that determine the 
bounds of the zone of ambiguity—the application of the traditional tools of statutory con-
struction—from those considerations that bear on the reasonableness of the agency‘s selec-
tion of one interpretation rather than another (assuming, perhaps provisionally, that the agen-
cy‘s interpretation falls within the zone of ambiguity). The former set of considerations may 
be unique to statutory interpretation. The latter set, however, are no different in kind from 
those that would be applied to any discretionary agency policy choice. 
  There may still be a tricky doctrinal classification problem for those rare cases when an 
agency‘s only (or principal) explanation for its interpretative choice is its legal conclusion 
that this choice is required by the statute (that is, the agency has no lawful discretion to do 
anything else). Assuming that the agency‘s interpretation is permissible under Chevron, the 
reviewing court would have to decide whether the agency‘s reason for selecting this particu-
lar interpretation (that it is required by the statute) is adequate under State Farm. In this li-
mited class of cases, then, a reviewing court may have to address the question whether the 
statute is ambiguous (that is, whether the zone of ambiguity contains more than one element) 
separately from the question whether the agency‘s interpretation is within that zone. But we 
do not find this especially troubling. As in all other State Farm cases, the reviewing court 
would decide whether the agency‘s explanation for its decision is arbitrary and capricious. 
As long as the agency‘s arguments as to why its interpretive choice is legally required are 
reasonable (that is, non-arbitrary), the agency should prevail under State Farm. If, however, 
the court concludes that the agency‘s claims of legal constraint are not reasonable—if, for 
example, the statute obviously permits more than one interpretation, or a challenger made 
timely comments to that effect which the agency did not adequately address—then the agen-
cy should lose under State Farm. 
34 486 F.3d 484, 492–93 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); id. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The 
constitutional avoidance canon instructs courts to avoid interpreting statutes in ways that 
raise serious constitutional questions when a reasonable alternative interpretation is availa-
ble. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501 (1979). STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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framed this difficult problem in terms of whether the avoidance canon is 
relevant at Step One or not. The shared assumption seemed to be that if 
it is (Judge Thomas‘s position),
35 then the canon takes precedence over 
Chevron deference, while if it is not (Judge Kozinski‘s position),
36 the 
canon is irrelevant in a Chevron case. Yet because Chevron‘s two steps 
are mutually convertible, deciding whether the constitutional avoidance 
canon applies at Step One or at Step Two cannot do any meaningful ana-
lytical work. If the canon is relevant at Step One, the court must still de-
cide whether or not the canon renders an otherwise reasonable agency 
interpretation clearly contrary to the statute‘s meaning. If the canon is 
relegated to the (allegedly distinct) Step Two, the court must still decide 
whether the canon renders an otherwise plausible agency interpretation 
unreasonable.  The  ultimate  substantive  question  is  identical  in  either 
case, so the classification question—Does the avoidance canon come in-
to play at Step One or Step Two?—is meaningless. 
Kenneth Bamberger has recently argued that normative canons of sta-
tutory  interpretation,  including  the  constitutional  avoidance  canon, 
should  be  treated  ―contextually‖  rather  than  ―categorically,‖  and  that 
courts deciding whether to use such canons to override agency interpre-
tations should therefore invoke these canons at Step Two rather than at 
Step One.
37 A great deal may turn on whether the relationship between 
Chevron and various canons of construction is governed by a rule-like 
hierarchy of interpretive principles or by a more standard-like contextual 
inquiry.  But  nothing  at  all  turns  on  whether  normative  canons  are 
brought into the interpretive inquiry at Step One or Step Two, because 
the two steps are mutually convertible. If, in context, judges find that 
normative canons imply a sufficiently powerful actual or constructive 
congressional intention to render the agency‘s interpretation impermiss-
ible, then this conclusion can be written in either the terms of Step One 
(an intention on the precise issue) or in terms of Step Two (an imper-
missible reading of statutory ambiguity).
38 A unitary  Chevron inquiry 
can accommodate any degree of context-specificity that is thought desir-
able, and conflating the question whether the relationship between Che-
 
35 Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d, at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. at 492–93. 
37 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymak-
ing, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 66–69 (2008). 
38 See Levin, supra note  3, at 1280 (arguing that there is ―no evident reason‖ why Che-
vron‘s two-step framework should affect the debate over the use of canons of construction). STEPHENSONVERMEULE_BOOK6  4/16/2009  1:53 PM 
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vron and normative canons should be governed by rules or standards 
with an artificial choice between applying those canons at Step One or 
Step Two, obscures the more important substantive and methodological 
questions at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
Sometimes judges write watershed opinions whose deep logic only 
gradually becomes clear and whose language fails to capture that deep 
logic. In such cases, there is no need for courts and scholars to cling to 
the  original  language  of  the  opinions,  at  least  where  abandoning  the 
original language would clarify matters without loss of content. Chevron 
is a case of this sort. Judges and scholars could simplify matters, at no 
collateral cost, by recognizing that  Chevron, notwithstanding the lan-
guage of the opinion itself and decades of subsequent exegesis, has only 
one step. 
 